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I. INTRODUCTION
One apparently inevitable consequence of war is damage to the environ-
ment. In the recent military action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) against Yugoslavia,' the environment itself was not a target as
*Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.A. 1985, Antioch College; J.D.
1987, Boalt Hall.
1. For the sake of convenience, the state using the name "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and
currently occupying the territory of the former Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro will be
referred to as "Yugoslavia." The use of this name is not intended as an endorsement of that state's
claim to be the continuation of the former Yugoslavia. (For more information on this problem, see,
e.g., Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union,
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it was in, for example, the Persian Gulf and Vietnam Wars. Nonetheless,
the aerial bombing campaign managed to inflict environmental damage
within the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This environ-
mental damage raises legal questions independent of the underlying legality
of the war itself. 2
The development of international law regarding the protection of the en-
vironment during wartime has lagged behind the development of peacetime
environmental protection. Law in this area, as in most areas of international
law, has advanced not steadily but in sudden leaps taken in response to in-
ternational incidents.
The purpose of this article is to explore the nature of the environmental
harm done by Operation Allied Force (the NATO bombing campaign),
as well as existing international and United States law regarding this type
of damage. The article will then examine whether NATO's actions vio-
lated existing law, and attempt to determine whether and how interna-
tional environmental law will be affected by this latest incident.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL HARM RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING OF
YUGOSLAVIA
The situation in Yugoslavia differs from that in the two major wartime
environmental incidents of recent times - the defoliation of Vietnam's for-
ests and the incineration of Kuwait's oil. In each of the latter two incidents,
the environment itself was a target; the state committing the environmental
harm deliberately set out to do so. In Yugoslavia, as is most commonly the
case, the environmental damage was incidental to the achievement of some
other objective.
As was the case in the Persian Gulf War, the environmental damage in
Yugoslavia has turned out to be less severe than was originally feared.3
However, a United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) team headed by
Pekka Haavisto concluded that measurable damage had occurred. Ac-
cording to Haavisto, "we talk about chosen hot spots where immediate ac-
tion has to take place, but not about a major ecocide or countrywide catas-
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1994)).
2. On the legality of the war, see, for example, Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NATO
Bombing Operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 Pace Int'l L. J. (forthcoming) (manu-
script on file with the author); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,
10 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?,
10 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1999).
3. See, e.g.. Jovan Gec, Pollution "Hot Spots" ID'd in.Serbia, Associated Press Online, July 27,
1999, available in 1999 WL 22027435.
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trophe." 4 Of Haavisto's "hot spots," the hottest is Pancevo.5
A. Pancevo
Considerable environmental damage resulted from the destruction of the
chemical factory complex at Pancevo, about 12 miles from Belgrade. Ac-
cording to NATO, the Pancevo petrochemical and fertilizer factory com-
plex and nearby Lola-Utva airplane factory produced chemicals and parts
for both military and civilian uses.6
According to Pancevo's mayor, Srdjan Mikovic, NATO aircraft struck
the chemical complex with at least 56 missiles on 23 days between March
24 and June 8, 1999.7 Among the destroyed targets were the complex's
storage tanks, containing thousands of tons of toxic chemicals! According
to Mikovic, chemicals released on a single day - April 18 - included
15,000 tons of ammonia, 1,800 tons of ethylene dichloride, 1,500 tons of
vinyl-chloride monomer, and 250 tons of chlorine.9 Three days earlier,
1,400 tons of ethylene dichloride had poured directly into the Danube,
while on another occasion workers dumped 9,500 tons of ammonia into the
river to reduce the danger from a NATO strike on the ammonia storage
tanks.'0 According to local attorney Curcin Dusan, the bombing also re-
leased mercury into the groundwater surrounding the complex.
If this information is accurate, the magnitude of the disaster greatly ex-
ceeds, in volume and probably in total toxicity, that of Europe's greatest
comparable peacetime incident, the 1986 Sandoz warehouse fire in
Schweizerhalle, near Basel, Switzerland. The Sandoz incident involved a
warehouse containing 1,351 metric tons of agricultural chemicals; much of
4. Steven Erlanger, U.N. Finds No Sign of Ecological Disaster in Kosovo [sic], SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, July 28, 1999, at A] 2.
5. See, e.g., id.; William Booth, A Ghost City of Mixed Poisons - NATO Bombs Left Site of Petro-
chemical Complex a Toxic Slough, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 1999, at A15; Uli Schmetzer, Serbs
Allege NA TO Raids Caused Toxic Catastrophe: Bombed Refineries, Plants Spewed Stew of Poisons,
They Say, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 8, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 2890920; Anna Varshav-
skaya, High Radiation Level Not Discovered in Yugoslavia, ITAR-TASs NEWS AGENCY NEWSWIRE,
July 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21032629.
6. Booth, supra note 5; Schmetzer, supra note 5.
7. Schmetzer, supra note 5. See also generally the submissions of Yugoslavia in its suits against
ten NATO members, e.g. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 1.C.J. 105 (Apr. 29) (Ap-
plication Instituting Proceedings of Yugoslavia) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/
iybeframe.htm> [hereinafter Application of Yugoslavia]; Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. BeIg.),
1999 I.C.J. 105 (Apr. 29) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures)<http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocketliybe/iybeframe.htm>. The documents submitted by Yugoslavia in each of
the ten cases are essentially identical, mutatis mutandis.
8. Schmetzer, supra note 5.
9. Schmetzer, supra note 5. Although Schmetzer does not specify, it seems reasonable to assume
that the figures Mikovic gives are in metric rather than English tons.
10. Schmetzer, supra note 5.
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this amount was washed into the Rhine by firefighters."
The effects reported from the Pancevo bombing have been similar to
those from the Sandoz fire. The city's air was filled with fumes for several
days, although the worst fumes were blown away from the city.'2 Local
residents have been experiencing respiratory and stomach ailments, as well
as burning eyes. Leaves have been turning yellow or black. Fish caught in
the Danube are sickly, while leeches used as bait are pulled out of the river
looking white and boiled.'
3
Doctors in Pancevo have been advising pregnant women to have abor-
tions.14 Local government officials have warned against eating vegetables
from the Pancevo area, and temporarily banned fishing in the Danube
downstream from Pancevo. 5 At least one reporter thought that Haavisto
seemed uncomfortable with the lifting of this ban.'
6
The Danube may be somewhat less polluted, and consequently better
able to withstand the influx of the additional pollutants, than the Rhine was
in 1986.17 However, as Avram lzrael, director of Belgrade's Warning Cen-




While the damage at Pancevo has been the most severe thus far alleged,
similar instances exist. The fate of the industrial town of Kragujevac, in
particular, was similar to that of Pancevo. 19 Unexploded munitions may
pose a long-term health hazard. Particular concern has been expressed over
the use of depleted uranium weapons,20 although Haavisto's group found
11. Aaron Schwabach, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International Law to Protect the Rhine
from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443,444-46 (1989).
12. Booth, supra note 5. See also Serbia Deemed Safe (Bomb Damage to Petrochemical Plants in
Serbia Causes Local Problems but Not Widespread Ecological Damage), CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 4,
1999, at 44, available in 1999 WL 9311181 ("[Haavisto's] study did not address air pollution expo-
sures during the conflict").
13. Schmetzer, supra note 5.
14. Booth, supra note 5; Schmetzer, supra note 5.
15. Booth, supra note 5.
16. Erlanger, supra note 4.
17. On the environmental problems facing the Danube, see generally, for example, Aaron Schwa-
bach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law,
14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290 (1996) [hereinafter Schwabach, Danube].
18. Quoted in Schmetzer, supra note 5.
19. Erlanger, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Up In Arms: NA TO Must Be Held Accountable for Its War Crimes,
Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, July 13, 1999, at 6; Application of Yugoslavia, supra note 7. Most
small-arms ammunition is made of lead, which is toxic. The United States Army has recently begun
a shift to tungsten bullets, "as part of a move to what it calls 'green ammunition."' Brass Hats Lead
to Tungsten, ECONOMIST, July 31, 1999, at 68.
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21no increased level of radioactivity from these weapons.
III. LAW REGARDING PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING
WARTIME
A. Public International Law
Public international law regarding the protection of the environment
during wartime has undergone, and is still undergoing, rapid evolution in
response to changes in environmental awareness and the nature of war. The
environment has been a military target since well before the Romans sowed
the soil of Carthage with salt. Incidental environmental damage during war
was probably already an old problem when Deuteronomy 20:19-20 sought
to impose limits upon it:
When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it, thou
shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou
mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the
field is man's life) to employ them in the siege;
Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt
destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that
maketh war with thee, until it be subdued.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the problem has
grown more severe, for two reasons. First, the overall burden placed on the
environment by human civilization is immeasurably greater than it was in
the times of the Romans or of Moses. Second, the capacity of humanity's
weapons and implements of war to injure the environment is also immeas-
urably greater; it is possible for unrestrained use of chemical, nuclear, and
biological weapons to render countries, continents, and even the entire
planet uninhabitable. That this has not already happened is in part a tribute
to the evolution of international environmental law, and the law of war gen-
erally, to confront these new dangers.
1. Sources of International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides
a traditional starting point for examining the sources of international law,
which include:
international conventions, ... international custom, as evidence of a gen-
21. Erlanger, supra note 4.
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eral practice accepted as law, . . . the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations, . . . judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations[.]
22
The sources of law listed in the statute (other than international conven-
tions) can, at the risk of oversimplification, be grouped together under the
heading of "customary international law."23 "General principles of law"
have traditionally been seen as a third and separate category of public inter-
national law. However, they can also be seen as "supplemental rules" or a
"secondary source of law."24 Judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most qualified publicists are merely a "subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law."25 In any event, judicial decisions and, to the extent that
a state actually observes them, general principles of law are state practice,
and thus form the basis for normative expectations.
2. International Conventions
The evolution and current state of international law regarding the protec-
tion of the environment during wartime, especially by means of conven-
tional international law, has been addressed by a number of commenta-
tors. 6 This topic owes its recent popularity in part to the environmental
22. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945), T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. The Statute is
silent as to which nations are to be considered "civilized."
23. On the different approaches to the sources of customary international law, see, for example,
W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of Interna-
tional Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984); INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN
WORLD POLITICS (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988); Derek W. Bowett, Inter-
national Incidents: New Genre or New Delusion?, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 386 (1987).
24. See, e.g.. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(4) cmt. I & Reporter's Note 7 (1987).
25. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 22, art. 38(1).
26. See, e.g.. Bernard K. Schafer, The Relationship Between the International Laws of Armed
Conflict and Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of Conduct Are Per-
missible During Hostilities, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 287 (1989); Ved Nanda, International Environ-
mental Challenges: "Sustainable Development" and "Environmental Terrorism," 3 TouRo J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1992); Richard Whitaker, Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations, 1995
ARMY LAW. 27 (Apr. 1995); Neil Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment, and
Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (1995) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law]; Neil Popo-
vic, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles
on Human Rights and the Environment, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487 (1996); Michael N.
Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of international Armed Conflict, 22
YALE J. INT'L L. I (1997); Mark Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move from
War Crimes to Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122 (1998); Karen Fair, Environ-
mental Compliance in Contingency Operations: In Search of a Standard?, 157 MIL. L. REv. 112
(1998); Eva M. Kornicker Uhlman, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the
Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms, I I GEO. INT'L L. REV. 101
(1998).
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destruction during the Persian Gulf war, which was subsequently discussed
in many excellent articles
27 and notes and comments.
28
a. The Hague and Geneva Regimes
Modem conventional law has advanced in response to, but always one
step behind, advances in environmentally destructive weapons. In 1868,
the Declaration of St. Petersburg stated that "the only legitimate object
which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy. ' 9 The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
provided that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the en-
emy is not unlimited. 30 The 1907 Convention also proscribed the destruc-
tion or seizure of the enemy's property, "unless... imperatively demanded
27. See, e.g., Margaret Okordudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian War: Legal Appraisal of an Envi-
ronmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123 (1991); Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Envi-
ronmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 67 (1992); Betsy
Baker, Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 351
(1993) (see esp. note 5, listing academic conferences on this topic); Virginia Morris, Protection of
the Environment During Wartime: The United Nations General Assembly Considers the Need for a
New Convention, 27 INT'L LAW. 775 (1993); William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in
Combat, 17 S. ILL. U.L.J. 299 (1993); Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification
Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "'Greening" the International Laws of
Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
793 (1996); Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage:
Challenges to International Law After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1995); Walter G. Sharp,
Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of
the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Florentino P. Feliciano, Marine Pollution and
Spoliation of Natural Resources as War Measures: A Note on Some International Law Problems in
the Gulf War, 14 HOus. J. INT'L L. 483 (1992); Philippe Sands, Moderator, Panel Discussion on the
Gulf War: Environment As a Weapon, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 214 (1991).
28. See, e.g.. Marc Ross, Comment, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible
Remedies to Combat Intentional Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 515 (1992);
Suzanne M. Bernard, Comment, Environmental Warfare: Iraq's Use of Oil Weapons During the
Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 106 (1993); Shilpi Gupta, Note, Iraq"s Environmental Warfare
in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 251 (1993); Mark T. Caggiano, Comment, The
Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: Customary Substance over Conven-
tional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1993); Laura Edgerton, Note, Eco-Terrorist Acts
During the Persian Gulf War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?, 22 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 151 (1992); Stephanie N. Simonds, Note, Conventional Warfare and Environmental
Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1992); Jesica E.
Seacor, Note and Comment, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 481 (1994).
29. Cited in Wilcox, supra note 27, at 303.
30. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, reproduced in
THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 100 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1915); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. The 1907 Hague Convention was the
fourth of thirteen to emerge from the 1907 Hague Peace Conference and is thus known as "Hague
IV."
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by the necessities of war."'" Since the environmental resources of a country
are generally the property of a state or of its citizens,32 this provision can be
construed as prohibiting wanton environmental destruction.
The Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Conventions were
adopted in the era after the development of weapons capable of causing
massive environmental destruction and loss of life, but prior to the use of
those weapons on a global scale in World War I. The most fearsome of
these weapons was probably poison gas, the use of which was prohibited by
Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention, which states that it is "especially
forbidden [to] employ poison or poisoned weapons," as well as arms "cal-
culated to cause unnecessary suffering., 33 The earlier 1899 Hague Con-
vention had produced a Declaration (but not a convention) prohibiting the
use of poison-gas projectiles, which were widely used in Europe during
World War 1.1
4
Poison gas had already been used in combat when this restriction was
adopted. Nonetheless, it was used on a much greater scale during World
War I, in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention. After the war, the use of
poison gas as a weapon was addressed much more effectively in the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol. 35 The 1925 Protocol, combined with the deterrent ef-
fect of retaliation in kind, was effective: poison gas has been used relatively
rarely in the last 75 years, and its use has almost always been condemned as
a violation of international law.
In preventing the use of other poisons, however, the Convention has been
less effective. Some theorists have argued that Iraq's release of oil, and
burning of oil to produce fumes, violated the 1925 Protocol.36 The use by
the United States of chemical defoliants on forests and agricultural lands in
Vietnam and Laos certainly violated the Protocol.
37
World War I also presented another new destructive technology: aerial
bombardment. For the first time, it became relatively easy for military
forces to attack targets well behind enemy lines. It became possible for ci-
vilian populations and industrial facilities to become targets on an unprece-
3 1. Id. art. 23.
32. But see Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 27, at 438-39.
33. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 23.
34. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L.
157 (Supp. 1907).
35. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061.
36. See, e.g., Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 27, at 190-91.
37. The United States, however, did not ratify the 1925 Protocol until after the end of its involve-
ment in the Vietnam War, and maintains that herbicides are not covered by the Protocol. Whitaker,
supra note 26, at 33. The United States, however, has renounced the use of herbicides for most
military uses. Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,187 (1975).
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dented scale. In World War II, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ja-
pan, Germany, and Italy all carried out campaigns in which civilian popu-
lations were targets, as well as attacks on industrial facilities which led to
massive environmental damage. World War II ended with the use of nu-
clear weapons against densely populated cities, with enormous loss of life
and disastrous environmental consequences. All of these attacks were car-
ried out in violation of the spirit of the 1868 St. Petersburg Convention and
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.
38
The era after World War II saw the emergence of modem concepts of
human rights law. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949,39 adopted pri-
marily to embody the new awareness of human rights law and prevent a re-
currence of the atrocities of World War II, also contained the beginnings of
modem concepts of environmental protection during wartime. The Con-
ventions prohibit the extensive destruction of property when carried out
unlawfully and wantonly and not justified by military necessity.4° They also
prohibit wilfully causing great suffering or serious bodily injury or injury to
health.
41
The Nuremberg war crimes trials after World War II included what may
have been the first recognition of a purely environmental war crime. Nine
German civilian officials in occupied Poland were charged with "ruthless
exploitation of Polish forestry" including "the wholesale cutting of Polish
timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to preserve the tim-
ber resources of the country. ''42 This exploitation violated Germany's duty
as occupier to safeguard Poland's property.
As Michael Schmitt states, however, "until the war in Vietnam, whatever
protection the environment enjoyed under international law was purely co-
38. See, e.g., International Peace Conference Final Act, July 29, 1899, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L
L. 103 (Supp. 1907) (prohibiting launching projectiles or explosives from the air); 1907 Hague Con-
vention, supra note 30, art. 25 (prohibiting attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns,
villages, or dwellings which are undefended).
39. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions I, 11, Ill, and IV, respectively].
40. Geneva Convention 1, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 39, art. 51;
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 147.
41. Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention 11, supra note 39, art. 51;
Geneva Convention III, supra note 39, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 147.
42. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948); discussed in RICHARD
FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-72 (1989); Caggiano, supra note 28, at 486-87;
Schmitt, supra note 26, at 64; Leibler, supra note 27, at 106; Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 27, at
201-02.
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incidental.""' It was the conduct of the United States during the Vietnam
war that brought about a widespread awareness of the danger to the envi-
ronment from war. In an effort to prevent the use of Southeast Asia's for-
ests as cover by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, the U.S. forces
in Vietnam used aircraft to spray 200 million gallons of the herbicides
Agent Orange, Agent White and Agent Blue on Vietnam and Laos. 44 As
much as 10% of the total land area of South Vietnam may have been
sprayed, of which about 86% was forest and 14% was agricultural land.45
"Rome plows" - tractors with cutting blades - were also used to clear
750,000 acres of land between 1967 and the end of the war.46 The U.S. also
seeded clouds in an effort to increase rainfall, rendering Vietnam's unpaved
roads more difficult to use.47 Napalm and conventional bombing also dam-
aged large areas of forest and agricultural land. These tactics caused the
loss of 8% of the region's agricultural land, 14% of its forests, and half of
its wetlands.48
The Vietnam war era corresponded with a growth in environmental
awareness worldwide and with considerable new activity in the area of in-
ternational environmental law. Reaction to the attack on Vietnam's envi-
ronment led to the adoption of two international conventions: Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions of 194949 and ENMOD. 0
Protocol I was drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross
between 1974 and 1977. The United States signed the Protocol in 1978,
but has not yet ratified it. The United States does, however, take the posi-
tion that much of Protocol I is customary law and thus binding."'
Most of the environmental protection provided by Protocol I, like all such
protection predating the enactment of Protocol I, is indirect. Protocol I also
contains direct protections, however. Article 35(1) reiterates the 1907
Hague Convention principle that "In any armed conflict, the right of the
Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlim-
43. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 9.
44. Popovic [Humanitarian Law], supra note 26, at 69.
45. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 9-10.
46. Schmitt, supra note 26, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Yuzon, supra note 27, at 795-96; Popovic [Humanitarian Law], supra note 26, at 69-70.
49. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M.
1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. A companion document, Protocol 11, regulates armed conflicts which
are not international in character. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
50. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modi-
fication Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter ENMOD].
5 1. See Schmitt, supra note 26, at 69.
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ited ...." Article 35(3), however, makes this provision specifically appli-
cable to the environment: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-
term, and severe damage to the natural environment." 
5 2
In applying this standard to the NATO action in Yugoslavia, or to any
action, the question that immediately arises is the definition of "widespread,
long-term, and severe." Despite numerous proposals to define these terms
more specifically, they remain open-ended.
Article 54 prohibits attacking, destroying, or rendering useless "objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," including water
supplies, in certain circumstances.53 The NATO attack on the factories at
Pancevo may have rendered the city's water supply useless, although it was
not done to deny the water "for [its] sustenance value to the civilian popu-
lation or to the adverse Party, 54 nor is it likely to "leave the civilian popu-
lation with such inadequate food and water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement." 55
Article 55, the most purely "environmental" provision in Protocol I, pro-
vides that:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term, and severe damage. This protection includes a pro-
hibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
56
Finally, article 56 prohibits or severely restricts attacks on facilities con-
taining dangerous forces:
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes
and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of
attack, even where those objects are military objectives, if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
57
This protection may be lost, however, if the facility is used in regular and
direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible
52. Protocol I, supra note 49, art. 35(1), 35(3).
53. Id. art. 54(2).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 54(3) (b).
56. Id. art. 55(1).
57. Id. art. 56(1).
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way to terminate such support."
Some commentators have been willing to expand the definition of
"works or installations containing dangerous forces" to include facilities for
the manufacture or storage of poisonous chemicals.5 9 It is not at all clear,
however, that this interpretation has been incorporated into the practice of
states.
Greenpeace and other environmental groups have called for a fifth Ge-
neva Convention aimed specifically at the protection of the environment
during war, and the General Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee has dis-
cussed such a possibility.6° The United States has taken the position that the
existing body of international law on the subject, if adhered to, already pro-
61vides adequate protection.
b. ENMOD
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)62 was intended to
prohibit the hostile use of large-scale environmental modification such as
the deforestation practiced by the United States in Vietnam, as well as pos-
sible new forms of environmental modification including weather control
and deliberate destruction of the ozone layer.
One writer points out that "[s]emantically, [ENMOD implies] that the
modification must be large-scale[,]" possibly including "earthquakes; ... an
upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns"
and so forth.63 Unless the environmental damage in Yugoslavia is far more
severe than it presently appears, it would not appear to fall within the scope
of ENMOD.64
The language of ENMOD Article 1, however, requires that the effect on
the environment, in order to fall under the treaty, be "widespread, long-
lasting, or severe.'65 Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee
58. Protocol I, supra note 49, art. 56(2) (c). This is the standard for "other military objectives."
For dykes, dams, and nuclear power plants, the support must also be "significant," and for a dam or
dyke the use must be "other than its normal function." Id., art. 56(1, 2).
59. See, e.g., Andrew D. McClintock, Comment, The Law of War: Coalition Attacks on Iraqi
Chemical and Biological Weapons Storage and Production Facilities, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 633,
637-40 (1993).
60. See generally Virginia Morris, Protection of the Environment in Wartime: The United Nations
General Assembly Considers the Need for a New Convention, 27 INT'L LAW. 775 (1993).
61. Id., notes 9 and 30 and accompanying text.
62. ENMOD, supra note 50.
63. Yuzon, supra note 27, at 806, citing Understandings I & 11 of the Conference of the Commit-
tee on Disarmament, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 377-78 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelffeds., 2d ed. 1989).
64. For a more complete discussion of ENMOD, see Schmitt, supra note 26, at 82-85.
65. ENMOD, supra note 50, art. I (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25:117
NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia
on Disarmament defines the terms as follows: "widespread" means ex-
tending over "several hundred square kilometers"; "long-lasting" means
"approximately a season"; "severe" means causing "serious or significant
disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
assets. 66
It seems more likely that the damage at Pancevo can meet at least one of
these requirements. Many of the ENMOD signatories, however, have dis-
sented from the proposed definitions in Understanding 1.67 Thus, Under-
standing I does not represent a consensus even among the signatories as to
the meaning of these terms.
c. The Rome Statute and the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The Rome Statute undertakes to establish a permanent International
Criminal Court to adjudicate crimes against humanity.6 Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
prohibits
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian ob-
jects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated.69
Security Council Resolution 808, which created the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, appears to be applicable by its
terms to "all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia," which
would include the United States as well as the other NATO members.70 In
Resolution 808, the Security Council is concerned with human rights viola-
tions. It refers to "obligations under international humanitarian law and in
particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.,' ' Thus, the Tribu-
nal's jurisdiction could conceivably be extended to cover environmental
66. Yuzon, supra note 27, at 806, citing Understanding I, supra note 63.
67. Yuzon, supra note 27, at 807.
68. Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
183/9 (1998). The Statute has been signed by 88 countries, including most of the NATO members
(although not the United States). It has been ratified by only four countries: Italy, San Marino,
Senegal, and Trinidad & Tobago. Of these four, only Italy is a NATO member. The Statute will not
enter into force until some time after it has been ratified or otherwise accepted by at least sixty
countries. For more information, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last modi-
fied Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.
69. Id., art. 8(2) (b) (iv).
70. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
71. Id.
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war crimes, although Resolution 808, unlike the Rome Statute, does not
specifically mention such crimes.
3. Customary International Law
There are two ways in which customary international law may be useful
in evaluating the legality of actions such as the destruction of the chemical
plant at Pancevo. First, the body of international environmental law (as op-
posed to the conventions dealing with wartime environmental damage dis-
cussed above) is largely customary. Second, customary law currently pro-
vides us with guidance in defining terms such as "military necessity," and
may also develop a definition for terms such as "widespread, long-term and
severe."
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention incorporates custom-
ary international law to fill any lacunae in the treaty regime governing state
conduct during wartime: 72
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued... the in-
habitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.
73
Thus treaties may derogate from customary international law, but in the
absence of such provisions the rules of customary international law are
binding on the parties to the 1907 Hague Convention. Note also that the
1907 Hague Convention itself has attained, through widespread observance
or at least aspiration, the status of customary international law. A certain
amount of bootstrapping thus results in a universal body of customary in-
ternational law on the topic, equally binding on all nations.
a. Customary International Environmental Law
Despite recent attempts at codification, state practice with regard to
transboundary environmental harm shows imperfect consensus, especially
in the areas of transboundary watercourses and marine pollution. 74 Certain
principles are widely acknowledged, however, if less widely applied. First
is the duty of each state not to allow its territory to be used so as to injure
that of another, as set forth in, inter alia, the Corfu Channel case75 and the
72. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 30, pmbl.
73. Id.
74. For a fuller exposition of the problems in some of these areas, see, for example, Schwabach,
Danube, supra note 17, at 323-340.
75. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 21 (Apr. 9, 1949) (determination on the
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Trail Smelter arbitration.76
Discussions of international environmental law generally begin with the
Trail Smelter arbitration, which first expressed the principle that a state has
responsibility for environmental damage outside its own territory.77 The
Trail Smelter arbitral tribunal stated that, under principles of international
law,
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a man-
ner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the prop-
erties or person therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
78
The decision of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel
case incorporated this general principle of limited territorial sovereignty,79
stating that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its terri-
tory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. '80
Similar formulations have been applied by municipal courts in environ-
mental cases, as for example in the famous Donauversinkung decision,81 in
which the Weimar Republic's Staatsgerichtshof stated:
[E]very State is bound by the principle springing from the idea of the
community of nations based on international law, that it may not injure an-
other member of the international community. Due consideration must be
given to one another by the various States[.]
It is inherent in the nature of warfare, of course, that states allow their ter-
ritory to be used for acts contrary to the interest of other states. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that the "do no harm" principle is abrogated
during wartime. The principle is consistent with the restriction of the Dec-
merits).
76. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RI.A.A. 1905 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684
(1941).
77. Id. For a dissenting view, criticizing the widespread reliance on the Trail Smelter Case, see
Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution By Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259 (1971).
It has also been noted that the passage cited is dicta. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 1001 n.8 (1992); see also Inter-
national Law and Protection of the Atmosphere, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 62, 77 (1989) (re-
marks by Sharon Williams).
78. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 76, at 716.
79. Corfu Channel Case, supra, note 75.
80. Id. at 22.
81. 116 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen, Suppl. Entscheidungen des Staats-
gerichtshofs 18; see also Ann. Digest & Rep. of Pub. Int'l L. Cases 128 (RGSt. 1927). Translated
and discussed in detail in J.G. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 433-36
(1984).
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laration of St. Petersburg that "the only legitimate object which states
should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces
of the enemy. 8 Environmental harm which does not have as its object the
weakening of the military forces of the enemy, or which is disproportionate
to that goal, is still forbidden.
Public and private international organizations have also addressed the
question of transboundary environmental harm. While the aspirational
documents thus produced create no legally binding obligations, they may
serve to show "the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions[.]" 83 To the extent that they are promulgated or (especially in the case
of United Nations General Assembly resolutions) voted for by certain states
and not by others, they may also provide insight into the practice or expec-
tations of those states.
Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment s4 provides that states have the "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the en-
vironment of other States[.]' '15 The Stockholm Declaration thus incorpo-
rates the Corfu Channel standard, prohibiting states from knowingly al-
lowing their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states.
The World Charter for Nature, 6 while in many ways a radical document,
retains a conventional limited territorial sovereignty approach to trans-
boundary environmental harm. The Charter (in actuality a General Assem-
bly resolution) provides that:
States... shall... [e]nsure that activities within their jurisdictions or con-
trol do not cause damage to the natural systems located within other
States[.]87
This duty to other states is expressed in language identical to that of the
earlier Stockholm Declaration8 8 and the later Rio Declaration. 9 More spe-
82. Cited in Wilcox, supra note 27, at 303.
83. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 22, art. 38(1).
84. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/REV.I (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm Declaration was
adopted by a vote of 103 in favor to zero against, with 12 abstentions; no roll call vote was recorded.
85. Id.
86. World Charter for Nature. G.A. Res. 37/7 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 37"' Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), 22 1.L.M. 455 (1983) [hereinafter World Charterfor Nature]. The
World Charter for Nature was adopted by a vote of Ill countries in favor to one (the United States)
against, with 18 abstentions (mostly Latin American countries, plus Algeria and Lebanon).
87. Id. art. 21(d).
88. See notes 84-85, supra, and accompanying text.
89. See notes 95-97, infra, and accompanying text.
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cifically, the World Charter for Nature also declares that "nature shall be
secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities." 90
The 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development
added relatively little to the existing understanding of state liability for
transboundary environmental harm. That portion of Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration9' relevant to transboundary environmental damage is identical
to the corresponding portion of Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration:
"States have.., the responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States[.]
92
The Rio Declaration does, however, also contain provisions specifically
relating to the protection of the environment during war:
"Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development... States
shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the envi-
ronment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further develop-
ment, as necessary.,
93
One view is that the inclusion of a separate article on wartime environ-
mental damage indicates that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
does not apply to such damage.94
The Rio Declaration also requires an environmental impact assessmene 5
and "prior and timely notification.., to affected states,, 96 although such
notification would be impractical during war. Perhaps the most encourag-
ing, even if purely aspirational, provision in the Rio Declaration is that
"[nlational authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs... the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution[.] ''97  Although theoretically this principle could be applied to
wartime as well as peacetime environmental harm, the practice of states
suggests that this has not been the case. The exception has been the Secu-
rity Council's imposition of financial liability on Iraq for harm, some of
90. World Charter for Nature, supra note 86, General Principles.
91. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, 47"b Sess., U.N.Doc. A/CONF.151/26(vol. 1) (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
92. Id. Principle 2.
93. Id. Principle 24. By contrast, the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility are strangely silent on responsibility for environmental damage caused by war.
94. See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 27, at 445. The United States took this position during
the drafting of Article 21. Id.
95. Rio Declaration, supra note 95, Principle 17.
96. Id. Principle 19.
97. Id. Principle 16.
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it environmental, done to Kuwait during the Gulf War. 
98
b. Customary International Law Regarding "Military Necessity"
In each of the restrictions on wartime environmental damage described
above, there is an explicit or implicit exception for military necessity. As
long as there is war, there is bound to be environmental damage as a result;
and, regrettably, there will probably always be war. Environmental groups
such as Greenpeace have proposed eliminating the military necessity ex-
ception altogether.99 To the extent that such attempts are actually attempts
to outlaw war, they are admirable, if unrealistic. If, however, the result is to
create a rule of war with which compliance is not possible, the rule will
simply be ignored.
Military necessity is evaluated by a subjective standard; excessive envi-
ronmental damage may be excused if it reasonably appeared necessary to
the decision maker at the time the action was undertaken.'0° The use of the
military necessity exception is limited by the principles of proportionality,
humanity, discrimination, and chivalry. The principle of chivalry relates to
the use of subterfuge, perfidy, and ruses and is not likely to arise in an envi-
ronmental context.'0 ' The principle of proportionality, on the other hand, is
always at issue when questions of military necessity for inflicting environ-
mental damage arise.
Proportionality requires that the force used be proportional to the desired
objective.' °2 One of the most clearly environmentally disproportional uses
of military force in history is the destruction of the Huayuankow Dike by
Chinese Nationalist forces during the Japanese invasion of China, prior to
the outbreak of World War II. The subsequent flooding killed several thou-
sand Japanese soldiers and succeeded in halting the Japanese advance in the
region. It also killed approximately 750,000 Chinese civilians - probably
the greatest loss of life ever caused by a single human action. Millions
more were left homeless, and millions of hectares of agricultural land were
98. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46"' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); see also S.C. Res.
674, U.N. SCOR, 45h' Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46"' Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
99. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 27, at 220-23 (remarks of Sebia Hawkins, Greenpeace Interna-
tional).
100. See, e.g., United States v. List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 759, 1296 (1947-48). See also generally W. Hays Parks, Air War and the
Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1990). Note that while this "reasonable commander" standard
may provide protection for individual military officers in war crimes trials, it is not necessarily a
defense to state liability.
101. See, e.g., Yuzon, supra note 27, at 811; Wilcox, supra note 27, at 303.
102. See, e.g., Yuzon, supra note 27, at 810.
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flooded; economic damages were incalculable.' °3
Discrimination requires that attackers distinguish military targets from
civilian ones.10 4 Humanity requires that military forces avoid inflicting suf-
fering, injury, or destruction beyond that actually necessary for the accom-
plishment of legitimate military objectives.'0 5 Taken together, these three
principles reiterate and expand upon the St. Petersburg principle, that the
only legitimate object for states during war is to weaken the military forces
of the enemy.
B. United States Law and Policy
Domestic law may in some cases impose more stringent environmental
constraints than international law. In the case of the United States, how-
ever, most environmental statutes have limited or no extraterritorial appli-
cability. The environmental aspect of the conduct of war against foreign
states is governed by executive orders and administrative regulations.
The extraterritorial applicability of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)10 6 is the subject of considerable debate. 107 For the time being,
however, it seems unlikely that NEPA will be applied to warfare against
foreign states.
Overseas activities of the U.S. military are governed instead by Executive
Order 12,114,108 which requires that the military comply with the spirit and
intent of NEPA when operating overseas. Although NEPA environmental
impact statements are not required, actions which will have significant en-
vironmental effects nonetheless require extensive environmental analysis
and documentation.'°9
The extent to which military planners actually comply with the spirit and
intent of NEPA no doubt varies greatly from one individual to the next.
Some military commentators, such as Fair,10 Schmitt,"' and Yuzon
112
103. See, e.g., Caggiano, supra note 28, at n.73. The Nationalists were, of course, damaging ter-
ritory and population which were (at least theoretically) theirs, and thus the case is different from
those of Pancevo, Kuwait, and, to some extent, Vietnam (because the government of South Vietnam
consented to the use of herbicides by the U.S.).
104. See, e.g., Yuzon, supra note 27, at 810-11.
105. Id. at 812.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
107. For two sharply contrasting views, see George H. Brauchler, Jr., Comment, United States
Environmental Policy and the United States Army in Western Europe, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 479 (1994), and Sylvia M. Riechel, Governmental Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115 (1994).
108. Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed.
Reg. 1957 (1979).
109. See id. at paras. 2-3, 2-4.
110. Fair, supra note 26.
Ill. Schmitt, supra note 26.
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write from an environmental perspective, while others, such as Whitaker" 3
and Brauchler," 4 seem to view Executive Order 12,114 as a useful tool in
avoiding documentation requirements and the necessity of performing envi-
ronmental impact analyses.
Yuzon advocates the adoption of a fifth Geneva Convention to protect
the environment."' Whitaker, on the other hand, points out that "most fore-
seeable military operations are exempt from the 'NEPA-like' analysis and
documentation requirement of [Executive Order] 12,114."t 16 He then notes
that, although "United States policy has been described as requiring adher-
ence 'to United States environmental requirements, if feasible[,]'"" 7 in ac-
tual practice "[c]ompliance with [Executive Order] 12,114 usually presents
few problems relative to an overseas operation.""' 8 This is because of the
"abundant and broad nature ... of exemptions [and because Executive Or-
der] 12,114 is not subject to judicial review and cannot be the basis for any
sort of litigation."" 9 Thus, "[j]udge advocates should leam the rules that
exempt most overseas operations from domestic environmental law re-
gimes. ,120 Then, when presented with any action with a possible detrimen-
tal impact on the environment, "[o]nce the [judge advocate] has identified
the proper [Executive Order] 12,114 exemptions, no further analysis is re-
quired.'
' 2 1
Whitaker is simply describing the existing regime; he repeatedly stresses
the importance of environmental concerns, pointing out that "even though
there is no requirement for... exhaustive analysis..., [judge advocates]
must ensure that their commanders consider the environment during every
phase of the planning process."' 22 Nonetheless, such a relaxed regulatory
regime must surely be the envy of every manufacturer and real estate de-
veloper in the United States.
The military application of Executive Order 12,114 is implemented by
Department of Defense Directive 6050.7.23 Each of the armed services also
has its own environmental rules and policies. The Army's environmental
112. Yuzon, supra note 27.
113. Whitaker, supra note 26.
114. Brauchler, supra note 107. Each of these officers is, of course, expressing a personal rather
than an official opinion.
115. Yuzon, supra note 27, at 486.




120. Id. at 39.
121. Id. at 30.
122. Id.
123. Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions, U.S. Department of
Defense, Mar. 31, 1979, cited in Fair, supra note 26 at 118 and nn.25-27.
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strategy, for instance, states that "[e]ach of you in the chain of command is
responsible for ensuring that... environmental stewardship is an integral
part of everything you do.' 24
Even this relaxed regime, however, is inapplicable to the Pancevo
bombing. Executive Order 12,114 exempts from environmental review ac-
tions taken under the direction of the President or a cabinet member during
an armed conflict.
25
With Policy Review Directive (PRD) 23, the federal government has be-
gun to review its policy on environmental impacts of government actions
overseas. 126 Military writers commenting on PRD 23 have greeted it with
disfavor.
12 7
Since attacking forces are not subject to the authority of the sovereign
whose territory they are attacking, there is no need to consider Yugoslavian
environmental law.22 Nor does it appear that U.S. forces attacking
Pancevo violated any provision of U.S. environmental law. Thus, if any
environmental protection exists in the Pancevo situation, it must come from
international law.'
29
IV. NATO'S ACTIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Whether NATO's attack on the complex at Pancevo violated interna-
tional law is to some extent a question of fact; it depends upon the degree
to which the complex was a military target. If, in fact, it was not manu-
facturing materials or munitions for the Yugoslav war effort, and the
NATO commander ordering the attacks should reasonably have been
aware of this, the attack was illegal. An attack on a purely civilian in-
stallation is a clear violation of the St. Petersburg principle and the ex-
tensive body of international law building upon it.
If, as seems more likely, the complex was in fact a dual-use facility, the
principles of military necessity, proportionality and humanity become rele-
vant. The destruction of the complex has caused measurable, long-term
harm to the local environment, and may have adverse consequences for the
lower riparians of the Danube as well as for the already-threatened Black
124. United States Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century, U.S. Dept. of the Army, (1992),
cited in Fair, supra note 26, at 113.
125. Exec. Order 12,114, supra note 108, at paras. 2-5(a) (iii).
126. United States Policy on Extraterritorial Application of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), Policy Review Directive/NSC-23, Apr. 8, 1993, cited in Fair, supra note 26, at 144.
127. See, e.g., Fair, supra note 26, at 146; Brauchler, supra note 107.
128. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 516 (1878).
129. International law is, of course, part of the law of the United States. See generally U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; art. 1i, § 2; art. VI; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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Sea. These costs must be balanced against the military advantage gained.
Again, this involves questions of fact; considerable investigation will be
required to determine what advantage was gained, what harm was done,
and to what degree this balance was or-should have been evident to NATO
commanders at the time.
In the past, the environmental effects of attacks on chemical facilities
have been largely ignored. 30 Little was said about the pollution resulting
from the Allied attack on Ploiesti during World War 11, although the de-
struction of Germany's Mohne Dam in the same war produced the aware-
ness that ultimately led to the Protocol I ban on attacks on dams.
On the one hand, these muted reactions may show that the practice of
states has been to excuse all environmental damage where even the slightest
military necessity exists. On the other hand, the more recent reactions to
environmental destruction in Vietnam and particularly in the Persian Gulf
war have produced a heightened level of awareness of military harm to the
environment during wartime. The environmental damage wrought by
NATO in Yugoslavia is being subjected to an unprecedented level of inter-
national attention, possibly showing a shift in the practice of states.
Environmental damage on the scale of Pancevo would have passed un-
noticed during World War H, and probably would not have excited com-
ment during the Vietnam or Persian Gulf wars. The increasingly negative
reactions of states to much larger instances of environmental harm in each
of these three wars, however, has resulted in an increasing sense of legal
obligation not to commit environmental damage, even during wartime, and
a decreasing tolerance on the part of non-belligerent states for any degree of
environmental harm during wartime.' 
3'
If the destruction at Pancevo did not actually violate existing interna-
tional law, it at least set a new standard. In the future, decision-makers will
have to anticipate that environmental destruction even on a local level, if it
is of Pancevo magnitude or higher, will attract unfavorable international
attention.
V. CONCLUSION: IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION DURING WARTIME?
The question which remains, of course, is to what degree decision-
makers will be influenced by international law. Even the most minute de-
gree of military advantage during combat may be worth an enormous
130. But see McClintock, supra note 59.
131. See, e.g., Fair, supra note 26, at 129-41, discussing the steadily increasing degree of envi-
ronmental planning in U.S. military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
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amount of post-war disapproval. This is especially true when the decision-
makers are acting for entities other than states, such as insurrectionist, sepa-
ratist, or national liberation movements. If such decision-makers fail to
achieve their military objectives and are defeated by the state against which
they are fighting, they can expect to be imprisoned or executed in any
event. Thus, they are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of trials for envi-
ronmental war crimes, let alone by lesser sanctions.1
2
All of the sources examined in this article show a consistent dichotomy.
Attacks in which environmental harm is the primary goal, whether by
forcing an axe against trees which produce fruit or by spraying defoliants
on tropical rainforests from airplanes, has invariably met with condemna-
tion. Attacks in which damage to the environment is an unsought conse-
quence of the achievement of some other objective, such as the impairment
of an enemy's ability to produce weapons, has generally been excused on
the basis of "military necessity."
Certain exceptions to this latter rule have been carved out, however.
Certain classes of weapons, especially nuclear and highly toxic weapons,
have been effectively outlawed. 133 Certain classes of targets, because of
their dangerous characteristics, have been outlawed. The time has.probably
come to include chemical factories in the same "ultrahazardous" category
as dams, dykes, and nuclear power plants.
Even states are likely to violate international law to avoid losing a war,
especially when a consequence of losing that war will be the end of the
state's existence in its present form. That is not what happened in Pancevo,
however. Countries such as the NATO members are well-positioned to
take environmental concerns into account. The NATO countries were win-
ning, not losing, the air war in Yugoslavia. They had a large number of
military and military-related targets from which to choose, and greater
awareness of the environmental consequences of their actions than their
predecessors in other wars.
Even if the destruction of the Pancevo complex violated international
law, it is unlikely that any NATO officers will be tried for war crimes as a
result, or that any remedy will be available to Yugoslavia. However, some
NATO states and others may provide aid to alleviate the damage, as
UNEP's Haavisto has urged them to do. 134 Several NATO members, in-
cluding the United States, have announced that they will provide only hu-
132. This problem, of course, is not unique to the environmental area. It shows up in every area
of the law of war. Recent problem areas include the use of land mines and child soldiers.
133. Regardless of the stated positions of several states regarding the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons, the practice of these states during wartime has shown that they do not consider the use of
nuclear weapons appropriate.
134. See Gee, supra note 3; Erlanger, supra note 4.
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manitarian assistance while Milosevic is in power.3 5 This restriction does
not, however, necessarily preclude giving emergency clean-up aid now or
environmental restoration aid at some point in the future. By providing
such aid, the NATO members might, without admitting wrongdoing, ac-
knowledge their awareness that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited."'
13 6
Thus, while it is unrealistic to expect a regime of international envi-
ronmental protection during wartime equivalent to that in place during
peacetime, it may be realistic to expect a steadily increasing level of
wartime environmental protection. International law in this area has
made repeated advances in response to catastrophic events. While cer-
tain types of actors are unlikely to comply with any environmental re-
strictions, the majority, including those states with the greatest capacity
for inflicting severe environmental damage, seem more willing to do so.
The high level of awareness of and attention to the environmental conse-
quences of the bombing of Yugoslavia make it likely that the NATO
states, at least, will take care to avoid such consequences in the future.
135. Gec, supra note 3; Christopher Walker, Another Victim of Milosevic - the Environment,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 21, 1999, at 9.
136. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 30, art. 22.
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